Uludağ Journal of Economy and Society/ B.U.Ü. İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi Cilt/Volume 38, Sayı/Issue 1, 2019 ss./pp. 1-23

REFLECTIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND THE FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ACTORS IN THE REGION FOLLOWING THE SYRIAN CRISIS (2011-2019)

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ABSTRACT

The relationship between the Turkish government and Foreign Humanitarian Actors (FHAs) has been and still full of tensions, misperceptions, lack of trust and many other gaps that started with the beginning of the Syrian refugee's influx to the country following the conflict in Syria back in 2011. This paper aims at understanding the relationship dynamics between the Turkish government and international foreign humanitarian aid providers who started to operate in the Turkish territories with the beginning of the Syrian crisis, bringing in a completely new concept to the Turkish context.

The research is qualitative based in terms of methodology, where set of unstructured interviews were conducted with high level government representatives related directly to the researched subject, and with FHAs representatives. There is no systematic approach or specialized department, which efficiently organizes the relationship between both actors until today. This is the main reason behind the huge relational gaps facing FHAs and the Turkish Government in working cooperatively.

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The main findings in this research paper includes a suggested paradigm of cooperation that will contribute to enhancing the relationship dynamics, bridge the gaps and support the humanitarian space. Hence increases Turkey's ranking amongst the countries piloting humanitarian work in later stages.

Key Words: Turkey, Humanitarian, Foreign Humanitarian Actors, Syrian Crisis, Refugees.

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SURİYE KRİZİ'NDEN SONRA TÜRK HÜKÜMETİ İLE BÖLGEDEKİ YABANCI İNSANİ AKTÖRLER ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİLER ÜZERİNE DÜŞÜNCELER (2011-2019)

ÖΖ

Bu araştırma, Türk Hükümeti ile Suriye Krizi'nin başlamasından sonra Türkiye sınırları için faaliyet göstermeye başlayan uluslararası insani yardım kuruluşları arasındaki ilişki dinamiklerini anlamayı ve Türkiye'deki durumla tamamen farklı olan HINGOs (sivil uluslararası insani yardım kuruluşları) konseptine açıklık getirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu iki taraf arasındaki belirsiz ilişkiler, şartların malum hassasiyeti, Türk Hükümeti'nin uluslararası insani yardım kuruluşlarına karşı şüpheci bakış açısı, bu kuruluşların hükümetin sınırlamaları ve bu alandaki tecrübe eksiklikleri yüzünden karşılaştıkları zorluklar araştırmacıların konuyu ele almasını zorlaştırmıştır.

Bu araştırma yöntem olarak nitelik temelli olup, araştırma konusuyla direk ilişkili olan üst düzey hükümet yetkilileriyle ve Türk Hükümeti'nin farklı kurumları ile direk ilişkileri olan uluslararası yardım kuruluşlarının temsilcileriyle yapılan röportajlarla oluşturulmuştur. Bu röportajlar taraflar arasındaki yanlış anlaşılmaları, ilişki kopukluklarını ve özellikle 2016 yılında yaşanan darbe girişiminin ardından ortaya çıkan yasal belirsizliklerle beraber yaşanan zorlukları ve iş birliği fırsatlarını anlamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Ulaşılan sonuçlar şu şekilde özetlenebilir; Türk Hükümeti insani krizlerle baş etme hususunda tecrübe eksikliği yaşadığını ve hala yaşamakta olduğunu kabul ediyor. Dolayısıyla uluslararası insani yardım kuruluşları Türk Hükümeti ile iş birliği yapmanın zor olduğunu belirtiyorlar. Sistemsel yaklaşım eksiliği ve iki taraf arasındaki ilişkileri etkili bir şekilde organize edebilecek bir uzman birimin yokluğu tarafların iş birliği içinde çalışamamasına neden olan ilişki kopukluklarının arkasındaki temel sebepleri oluşturuyor.

Bu çalışmayla ortaya konan öneriler, ilişki dinamiklerinin geliştirilmesine katkı sağlayacak bir iş birliği örneğiyle ilişki kopukluklarını gidermek ve insani çalışmalara daha fazla alan sağlamayı içermektedir. Böylelikle Türkiye'nin insani yardım faaliyetleri yürüten ülkeler arasındaki derecesi yükseltilebilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, İnsani Yardım, İnsani Yardım Kuruluşları, Suriye Krizi, Mülteciler.

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INTRODUCTION

Security panics, governmental complications, humanitarian crises and refugees are all key words in a vital worldwide recognized field of study that examines the work of Humanitarian aid providers. Modern political world of today is all concerned about refugees who are increasing in numbers at the same time with inhuman situations in different parts of the world, especially in the Middle East. The need for having a third party supporting the delivery of services is becoming significant. In fact, this issue is important and is not a new trend as it evolved long time ago with the rise of man-made crises in the world, such as the two world wars (Wong 2012).

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Governments in Europe and the Americas started to realize later on the strategic dimensions of empowering the transnational civil society organizations represented by Humanitarian Actors in the first place. This trend as any other trend, spread all over the world especially with the foreign intervention in the crisis region by providing humanitarian assistance to those affected. With the crisis arriving in Turkey, dealing with a huge influx of Syrian refugees, as we are talking about more than four million Syrian refugees crossing to Turkey fleeing the war that has started in 2011 (Ozden 2013).

Turkey tried to deal with and manage the crisis, but it was alone. Lacking experience in providing humanitarian aid, the problem exceeded Turkey's capacities and it had to open the space for FHAs to come in and take the burden off the government's shoulder. Yet, this didn't encourage the government to have a third party in charge to manage this whole process. The Turkish government kept the FHAs sector under their eyes, including imposing limitations and regulations on their operations. Despite the fact that the Turkish government realizes the importance of empowering its civil society's different spheres, as an important step towards democratization in the process of accession talks to the European Union since 2011 (Canefe 2016).

Obviously, the Turkish government couldn't work out a system or a hub to run this sector under the wings of the government. The relationship dynamics between the Turkish government, FHAs and the implications of the failed military cope of 2016 on shrinking the

humanitarian space are important factors. They increased tension between FHAs and the government of Turkey, with some parties in the West accusing Turkey of damaging the democratic image in the country. This study will try to examine the roots of this gap by putting together both perspectives to answer the research questions.

The research paper is testing the following Four main hypothesis:

H1: The organizational structure that regulates the professional relationship between the Turkish government and humanitarian actors (FHAs) is counterproductive.

H2: The humanitarian actors of FHAs suffer from a lack of support and difficult operating conditions in Turkey.

H3: The Turkish government doesn't make effective use of a opportunities that FHAs can provide in support to the given and continuous refugee's crises in house.

H4: The Turkish laws and regulations are restrictive and make it hard for humanitarian actors on different levels, whether establishmentwise or when it comes to operating properly to serve the purposes of these actors.

1. TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AID PROVIDERS (THE RELATIONSHIP DYNAMICS)

The concept of having a Civil society organization in Turkey is not a new concept. CSOs are considered the heart of Turkey's democratization process, internally over the past two decades the sector has grown and enlarged also played important role in providing services and supporting the country's democratization efforts despite of the fact that this sector has been suffering restrictions and legislative complications also due to the political events and complications in the country such as the Gazi Park protests 2013 and the failed military coup attempts 2016.

But the Humanitarians International Non-Governmental Organizations FHAs is the new concept in the country, especially the western funded, it started to flourish recently with the efforts the

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government is investing in dealing with the Refugees crisis in the country in addition to fixing the damaged image of Turkey at the west side especially after many political incident where Turkey was accused of being far from democracy, therefore having a healthy relationship dynamic with FHAs community is early to happen, especially under all the political tensions and circumstances the country has been passing through.

Since Turkey possess a distinctive strategic, political and cultural position globally, it ended up eventually as a significant role player in the international migration and border security debates. Turkey's geographical and political closeness to the European Union has made it an attractive destination for international migration. This in turn has increased the strategic significance of Turkey as a transit point and a destination country in this sense. As for this reason, Turkey and its boarder, asylum and migration policies are very important for the international community, academic circles and in particular the EU (Soysal 1994).

For many reasons, Turkey has been one of the countries in which asylum seekers and refugees especially from Middle East find it easy to settle in, in addition to the Balkan Wars in the early 1990s that resulted in increasing the number of refugees in the country, while the Syrian Civil War comes as a boosting factor (Senses 2016). Turkey applied the 'open-border policy' in order to make it easier for Syrians who fled the war to enter and find a better secure living conditions settling in the camps that were built in the border areas between both countries; however, the camps was not fully reach to meet the huge influx of refugees that exceeded 4,8 million. "The latest report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) announced that more than 3.2 million Syrian refugees (53% male and 47% female; 55% above the age of 18) have been registered in Turkey" ('Syrian Regional Response, UNHCR 2017). For that reason, the majority of the refugees were allowed out of camps and are settled in different cities mainly Istanbul and other border cities like Sanliurfa, Gaziantep, and Hatay. It's always combined with challenges.

Turkey together with United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) all have faced serious problems and challenges in managing and controlling the Syrian refugee's crisis on different aspects. The most important and only internationally agreed upon policy, which has

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been implemented so far is a 'deal' or in other words EU boarder's protection measures between the EU and Turkey, in which Syrian refugees who tries to illegally reach Greece and other neighboring countries were returned to Turkey (Council of the EU 2016).

Also, according to the same agreement, the EU pays the Turkish government amount of \in 3 billion to be spent as a hosting cost for Syrian refugees in Turkey, in addition to another ambitious promise of removing the Visa restriction for Turkish citizens. Unfortunately, and expectedly that deal only served one purpose which is protecting EU countries from the illegal influx of refugees (Rygiel, Baban & Ilcan 2016).

The Syrian Refugees living conditions, needs and integration concerns or even the adaptation of the local citizens to their existence do not seem to be important concern for any of the parties, not for Turkey or the EU or any other international parties. As a result of this confusion and lack of experience in how to manage such a humanitarian crisis at the state and international levels, an interesting number of national and international foreign NGOs found their ways into the country to support managing the refugee's crisis and offer their support to the government especially in terms of service delivery. On the other hand, the relationship between FHAs and the government is still limited and more of tensed at one point where many default factors can be considered as causes of the tension between both actors, mentioning the huge number of Refugees residing the country, the economic crisis, the political sensitivity of the region, security threats and Turkish public opinion.

A few official institutions that do the primary registration of the Syrian refugees, address their basic needs work in areas that needs high cooperation with the government like legal settlement, health, housing, food, and education. They all intersect with many governmental institutions especially throughout the implementation phase. Obviously, what has been observed so far is that there is a weak cooperation and coordination and lack of systematic communication between both sectors (See an interactive network of the I/NGOs operating in Turkey).

This is what has been agreed upon in terms of the relationship dynamics between both the Turkish government and FHAs

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community in Turkey. After a careful reading and scanning of related publications, the relationship dynamic in the Turkish context is described by the term of political confusion. Additionally, the Turkish laws regulating their work are getting more complicated, especially after the failed military coup attempt back in 2016 where many INGOs were accused of being involved. Accordingly, they were forced to shut down and their staff were arrested. Since the start of FHAs sector after the refugee's crisis began, the government was overwhelmed and couldn't think of organizing that sector properly. There was not a hub or specialized department that manages the work of FHAs. Moreover, FHAs fund is what revives the local NGOs in Turkey where local NGOs depends on FHAs fully or partially since they serve as an implementation arm for the international nongovernmental organizations.

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2. THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING A STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ACTORS AND TURKISH GOVERNMENT

The importance of having a structural relationship between government and civil society in general works beneficial for both actors on different aspects. Narrowing down to Turkey which is the focus of my thesis, having a strong system to organize this relationship is significant for the country's political wellbeing in the first place. FHAs played a basic role in supporting the Turkish government during humanitarian crisis that started 2011, especially since the government's adaptation of an open borders policy for Syrian refugees to escape the conflict back in that time, consequently that increased the hospitality complications and increased hosting limitation especially that turkey lacked the practical humanitarian experience in this context, talking about integrating refugees into the new hosting community on different aspects as a major challenge. Another important humanitarian role was played by the FHAs is political humanitarian diplomacy, for example according to the guardians thanks to the efforts of civil diplomacy that has been brokered by IHH which is independent INGO running in Turkey, they managed to free 48 detainees including Turks from the hands of a rebel group in Syria back in 2013 (the guardians2013). This and more says a lot about how having organized structural relationship

between both actors is important, in addition to an open channel of coordination which can support the efforts of rising up with the humanitarian work. Furthermore, it can reflect positively on the country's image by supporting the acceleration of the democratization wheel. The FHAs can be doors of connections and bridges to enhance Turkey's presence as part of the western, developed civilized communities.

3. FACTORS AFFECTED THE RELATIONSHIP DYNAMICS BETWEEN FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ACTORS WITH THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT

The relationship between both actors was never stable since 2011, with FHAs starting to operate in the Turkish territory. Turkey has been always sensitive to any foreign interference in neither its affairs nor in its land even if it was humanitarian due to the crisis the country is facing. Civil society in general has also been affected by many unstable pressures and factors, counting in; the continuous tensions over the Kurdish matter, security threats teeming from Syria, a chain of terrorist attacks hitting the country by ISIS and other suspects, fast increasing in the number of refugees, several nonstop political deadlocks, severe decline in economy, and a failed military coup attempt. The dangerously coup attempt on July 15, 2016 was a critical turnover point in the modern political history of the country. This unpredicted incident resulted in a severe disruption in policy making sphere. The previous context of political disturbances especially postcoup measures and declaring the emergency status, have paved way for the state to restrain basic freedoms, plus increasing suspiciously the focus on FHAs by starting to investigate and suspect the existence of many humanitarian foreign actors, for the sake of preserving the national security of the country (Civic Freedom Monitor, Turkey 2019).

In different words, the previous factors were not encouraging the humanitarian work to develop and had an adverse impact on the relationship between public governmental institutes and humanitarian aid providers, hence affected negatively the huge fund brought by the international humanitarian sector to support the Turkish government in managing the inflated number of refugees residing the country since 2011.

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FHAs working cross boarders may encounter harm and serious problems if they are suspected of collaborating with or supporting minorities or political groups that the Turkish government listing as anti-state or against 'national unity'. On different perspective, the majority of the FHAs operating in Turkey come from Western countries such as Germany, Ireland, United Kingdom and Denmark) and are funded by their governments or the European Union to serve two specific aims: first, to prevent refugee flows towards European countries and keep them in Turkey, which is considered to be a safe country. The EU countries, with the refuge crisis accelerating in the world, reaching the top of their agendas are no more in favor of hosting and receiving any asylum seekers or refugees especially from the Middle East. For that reason, they are pushing money in the form of humanitarian assistance to keep refugees away of their boarders as much as they can, not just in Turkey but all over the world. The EU policies have changed and no more flexible as before, especially that the European population in many of EU countries started to complain their countries policies towards Refugees. On different point of view the policy shift can be related to very trending concepts, the Islamophobia and Terrorism.

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Second, to contribute to the projects in Turkey and provide humanitarian support for refugees to fuel the first aim. Regardless of the fact that many FHAs have been shut down, there is still a significant number of others continue to provide humanitarian aid inside Turkey and the number is increasing. Different forms of humanitarian aid services are provided by these humanitarian actors. In cooperation with the Turkish official institutions who were appointed by the government to lead the humanitarian sector, the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) and Turkish Red Crescent, HFAs started with basic protection needs projects (e.g., clothes, shelter, Food) in the beginning of the crisis. Hence as the conflict continues, these organizations have started to develop and diversify their projects and focus more on supporting livelihood, and socio-cultural and psycho-social support (PSS). Still FHAs suffer even getting permissions from authorities to implement those projects (Howell 2001).

This leads to the conclusion of that having cooperative working framework among stake- holders including government agencies, through a well-structured organizational hub could support and

facilitate the humanitarian efforts in general, and FHAs work in particular, in order to upgrade the services provided to Refugees across the country. Hence There is room for cooperation between the government and HFAs. This decision of independent action and lack of coordination results in duplication of humanitarian assistance services and inefficient employment of resources. This unorganized structure must be rearranged in order to provide better services to refugees, since Turkey seems to have prolonged Refugees crisis for longer years to come.

4. REFLECTIONS ON THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE OF FHAS (AFTER CONDUCTING INTERVIEWS)

As this study is interview based in terms of research methodology, series of interviews were conducted with government officials, diplomats and experts from Ministry of Foreign affairs, Ministry for EU affairs, Directorate General of Migration, also with former politicians who were in charge of partially managing the relationship between the Turkish government and the humanitarian aid providers. There was a consensus amongst government officials over the fact that the Turkish government including its different institutes lacks experience in handling humanitarian crisis, hence humanitarian aid foreign actors. According to officials from MoI "As of today we appreciate INGOs and they are important for us". The Turkish government planned only for six to eight months emergency response, they did not expect neither the number nor the length of the crisis.

Officials expressed their major concerns towards the FHAs sector by clearly stating that many organizations refused to cooperate and coordinate with the government institutions, claiming that they already planned their budgets and projects, many other organizations don't comply with the Turkish rules and regulations, still uses cash distributions in their activities which is completely not acceptable by the government. According to officials the government has the right to control where this money is going and ensure that it doesn't end up in hands of terrorist groups who would use it to harm the country's security.

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As perceived by the government and acknowledged later on by some FHAs representatives, some foreign humanitarian aid providers came to operate in Turkey with wrong backgrounds, they were coming from Africans countries where they were treated like a government because they have the money and power, FHAs misunderstood the Turkish context and thought that the can operate without any regulations, wherever they want, ignoring the government. According to officials "INGOs made a huge mistake by thinking that they can operate as third power without coordinating with us". They thought that because we need them, they can work freely without being held accountable for their mistakes. The Turkish government tried to support in the beginning of the crisis when international aid started to flow into the country, by facilitating projects implementation and tried to partake and partner with international NGOs, but the attitude of the Foreign aid providers according to the government was not appropriate and the government efforts were faced with rejection. Officials clearly said "we realize that we lack experience in dealing with the humanitarian sector as it's a new phenomenon for us, but also INGOs went so far in ignoring the government and none of their country would accept this behavior, same applies to Turkey". Mr. Veysi Kaynak, the former Deputy Prime Minister in the government of Binali Yıldrım said clearly" We wanted those NGO's to coordinate with us. That's why we made these regulations. Otherwise there is a high risk for money laundering by using some of those organizations. Second some organizations hired personnel and we have the right to check their background. Third, in any independent country the humanitarian aid providers must know their boundaries and be stopped from doing any intelligence work that might harm the country. These are the three-main reason.

He emphasized on the fact that humanitarian sector needs to organize and better coordinate their work, in order to avoid sensitive problems with the government, and guarantee efficient provision of humanitarian services. Government acknowledged that there is no one responsible department for humanitarian aid affairs within the government and this make it hard to follow up and effectively support the international aid actors, this keeps them under suspicion because according to officials from Ministry of Interior stating " we don't know what they are doing because we are not in the field, its hard to control from different departments where there is zero coordination between governmental institutes in this sense".

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On different perspective regarding what happened after the failed military coup attempts in 2016, the government sees that every country has the right to preserve its national security, not just that even the UN charter declares that countries have the right to announce state of emergency in order to face their national security. It was claimed by the Turkish government that Some humanitarian aid actors were caught distributing weapons wrapped by tents they were distributing to fleeing civilians during "Euphrates Shield Operation" end of August 2016. Others were refusing to work in areas of high refugee populated and were insisting to operate in Divarbakır for example, the city where terrorist groups exist. According to Mr. Kaynak "which country will accept that". The government tried to open channels for dialogue and feedback, and organized an initiative that was led by Mr. Kaynak when he was in office in 2016/2017. There was regular meeting call for FHAs senior representatives to work on drafting a circular, to support providing humanitarian assistance in effective and efficient manner to people in need, affected by the conflict or displacement, residing in Turkey or cross its borders. For this purpose, the circular was drafted within the frame work of international agreements tackled all operational challenges and suggested solutions, the circular was shared later on with line ministries for endorsement. After few Months, the circular was rejected by Ministry of Interior who considered this as interference in the internal Turkish affairs. Some other officials saw that the language used by FHAs was not appropriate, they said "you cannot tell the government what they should do to facilitate your work". The circular will be attached to the research as an appendix. One last important thing highlighted by all officials interviewed "the government needs the FHAs sector, and not ready to shut the sector down, it is impossible to handle alone"

5. REFLECTIONS ON THE FHAS PERSPECTIVE OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT (AFTER CONDUCTING INTERVIEWS)

A series of interviews were conducted with different FHAs representatives and liaison officers operating in Ankara, Gaziantep and Hatay. The humanitarian aid providers differentiated in the way they perceive the Turkish government based on individual experiences. Since there was nothing reported officially in this regard. There was a consensus amongst interviewed FHAs that they did not

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take the government seriously at the beginning of the crisis. They thought they can operate freely as was the case in the African countries in which they were operating before coming to Turkey. INGOs representatives acknowledged that this was a mistake from their side and justified saying" we did misunderstand the context, and we didn't realize how serious it could reach". On the other hand, the government decision makers did not really pay attention in the beginning, because they thought that it's a six to eight months crisis and it will be over. Unexpectedly the crisis is still ongoing until today.

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According to FHAs "the Turkish government realized that they should regulate and impose laws and restrictions very late, this affected our operational capacities severely" humanitarian workers through the blames on the Turkish government, stating that they cannot be absent from the image for years and suddenly show up imposing rules and regulations without even being aware of what humanitarian work means. That was the case following what happened in 2015 when the vice prime minister at that time started to visit Gaziantep and arranged big meeting on December where he stated "ok all of the humanitarian organizations until today, you did whatever you want, we are closing and opening a new white page and what I want you to do is from now on, I give you three months until the first of April to be complies with all the laws and legislations of Turkey , if not I'm sorry but you will expose your organization to a complete shutdown". Unfortunately, the continuous changing of government officials affected the government credibility and increased confusion to the FHAs in which there is no one professional reference in the government where they can refer to. Nevertheless, The FHAs after started to settle their legal situations, but couldn't comply with all rules and regulations. X organization stated that" it's very hard to keep up with the Turkish regulative demands, because whenever you comply to something they demand more".

Another Y Organization Representative stated that "the government is processing our registration since almost year with no clear answer, we are operating from home, this is harming our operational capacity, we cannot open a bank account or hire required personnel. We were pushed to implement through local partners, which is a huge shift in our strategy". There was also an agreement amongst humanitarian actors that the Turkish government is using the registration issue as a

play card, to suspend the work of some organizations that operates in undesirable security posting areas across the borders. Following the carrot and stick policy as described by FHAs.

According to FHAs, they realize very well that the Turkish government have zero experience in the field and that they are trying to cover up this with restricting and complicating the operational conditions for them, there is consensus now amongst humanitarian actors that they should comply to the rules and regulations in order to operate smoothly. Despite of that they are still facing problems. Based on statement by Y organizations" we are complying to all laws and regulations, the government suddenly started to reject work permits for some of our Syrian employees with no reasons, then they came and fine us with 60,000 Turkish Lira because they are still working".

"The Turkish government keeps changing government officials, every period of time we have to coordinate with completely different person. This affected our decision-making process, hence our fund flow |". Since the beginning of the crisis the Turkish government gave Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey (AFAD) the responsibility of leading the humanitarian sector, following up with FHAs work, still this was perceived insufficiently by Aid actors and at some extent, many did not take it serious as well. According to Humanitarian liaison officers "we are facing problem, we don't know we should talk to whom, we rely on our personal relations in the government to get the work done, but if they changed person in charge we will have worst conditions". The FHAs operating in Turkey realizes their importance to the government but also realized that they should coordinate with the government they just don't know how. They argue that having to deal with different governmental mentality every period of time is confusing to their donors too, according to Z organizations" as INGOs we are the key people who provides information to the decision makers within the organization, in the same time, we are the same people who changes the recommendations because the feedback that we receive from the government differentiated due to governmental changes. So, there is no stability, and this affects our operations, our fund and our existence".

One important factor that was affecting how both actors perceive each other's is the Turkish media, until very recently false news is

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published accusing many humanitarian actors of being spies and corrupted. Meanwhile FHAs prefer to keep low profile in terms of replying back, up to the sensitivity of the context, what is being published on regular basis affects the FHAs operations at some level, for example according to one well known humanitarian organization" everybody in the government reads Daily Sabah magazine, I personally witnessed a situation where whole file of work permits applications for an INGO was rejected just because the organization name was mentioned in one of the publications that the responsible employee was reading, nobody cares". FHAs think that the government is challenging them by media which could be completely wrong, due to lack of communication. The way FHAs perceives the Turkish government can be clearly understood from all what has been explained earlier. What is next? remains the unknown concern for all FHAs who are operating in Turkey especially that situations after the failed military Coup of 2016 became more complicated, according to the NGOs forum.

CONCLUSION

Today's world is facing nonstop humanitarian, political and economic crisis, conflicts and natural disasters that yield in huge increasing numbers of people who escape a conflict, flee a natural disaster zone or seek asylum for political and economic reasons. Humanitarian response efficiency measure, started to become a criteria for ranking countries in terms of development and compliance to human rights, that why we see countries in race to settle the best humanitarian settings within their systems, Turkey have joined the crew with the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2011, as a completely new concept to the Turkish culture, the government is still trying to adapt the humanitarian sector and work on strengthening the relationship between the Government and the Foreign Humanitarian Actors (FHAs).

After accurate analysis to the data collected by conducting interviews with officials from the Turkish government representing (MoI, MoFA, Former deputy PM, DGMM AND Municipalities) and with FHAs representatives operating in cities that are highly populated with refugees, where the main purpose was understanding the relationship dynamics, gaps and operational obstacles causing the tension between both actors, hence bringing up closers both

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perspectives to enhance cooperation, and support the humanitarian space for the benefit of both the Government and the humanitarian actors, in this regard we recognize these main results:

The Turkish government obviously lacks experience in dealing with Refugees crisis, where adopting the open boarder strategy at the beginning of Syrian crisis, brought in unexpected number of refugees to the country. And the crisis lasted for unexpected amount of time. This created humanitarian, social, political and economic problems from a broader aspects, the Turkish government started to ask for help from the international community, and started to open for humanitarian actors to come in settle and work to support the government in managing the crisis, unfortunately up to many factors, the political culture of the Turkish couldn't easily absorb and manage the humanitarian sector which is a new concept to the Turkish context, with lack of follow up in what is happening in the field, in addition to all security disrupts and confusion, this reflected negatively on the humanitarian space, reflected a weak image of the countries humanitarian efforts to the West, and undermined any efforts of cooperation between the government and humanitarian actors

For Foreign Humanitarian aid providers (FHAs), misperceiving and the Turkish context in the beginning of their operations, and considering the Turkish regime similar to the African systems in which they were operating before they come to Turkey, where they were given all power and authority to operate the way they want, wherever they want was completely wrong, and was the main reason why the Turkish authorities started to complicate their work and restrict their operations once they realized the situation. The stubbornness and rejection of complying to the laws and regulations in addition to some FHAs crossing boundaries while implementing the humanitarian activities in the field, resulted in undesirable actions taken by the Turkish government against the whole FHAs sector and pushed the government to suspiciously perceive foreign humanitarian aid providers, hence complicating their operational sphere regardless of the fact that they still need them as of today.

Due to the fact that the whole prolonged situation of refugee's crisis was unexpected. Whether for Turkey or the International Humanitarian Community. The Turkish government preparedness

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and HRP were only set for Eight months maximum. So, they did not expect that this will last until today and maybe many years to come furthermore, did not have any kind of knowledge in how to integrate the humanitarian components into the government structure to organize the work of the sector, with assigning the lead of the FHAs sector to different political figures who keeps changing, governors, AFAD, Municipalities in some cases, with all barriers especially language barriers, this harmed further the cooperative relationship between the Government and FHAs in which complains were raised from both actors, they don't know how to link and how to organize the social and operational relations. The appropriate system to proactively, jointly manage the sector is missing and reflecting negatively on both sides.

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There is a strong opportunity for bridging the gap between the Turkish Government and FHAs sector, based on the fact that both actors now recognize their need for each other's to efficiently lead in the humanitarian work, the Turkish government realizes that they cannot manage this huge need without the support of the FHAs community and their fund, the FHAs realizes that they cannot operate efficiently without complying to the governments rules and regulations, despite of the fact that they have comments and difficulties in many areas, there is readiness by both parties to work on bridging the relational gaps, and work jointly to rise up with the humanitarian community.

There was lack of clear literature in respect to the research paper topic, due to the relational complications and continuous struggles. Moreover, the political sensitivity of the research context made it hard to dig further in the reasons behind certain major FHAs shut downs by the Government, in addition to language barriers where most of Turkish politicians doesn't speak English and required hiring a translator, which was the case.

The findings and results of the research proved the four-proposed hypothesis successfully. So it proved that the organizational structure that regulate the professional relationship between both actors basically is weak and counterproductive, and proved that FHAs suffered and still suffer from lack of support in difficult operating conditions in Turkey, also proved that the Turkish government

doesn't make any effective use of opportunities that FHAs can provide given the continuous refugees crisis in the house, finally proved that the laws and regulations are restrictive and complicated affecting negatively the humanitarian space in the country.

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ÖZET

Günümüz dünyası; çatışmadan ve doğal afet bölgesinden kaçan ya da siyasi ve ekonomik nedenlerle iltica arayan çok sayıda insanın doğurduğu kesintisiz insani, politik ve ekonomik kriz ile karşı karşıyadır. Günümüzün dünyasında, dünyanın farklı yerlerinde insanlık dışı durumlarla aynı anda karşılaşılmakta ve artmakta olan mültecilerle ilgilenmek giderek devlet dışı aktörlere kalmaktadır.

Devletler de hizmeti sunacak üçüncü bir tarafa ihtiyaç duymaktadırlar. Bu ihtiyaç, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası ortaya çıkan bir eğilimdir. Avrupa ve Amerika'daki hükümetler STK'ların temsil ettiği ulus ötesi sivil toplum örgütlerini güçlendirmenin stratejik boyutlarını kavramışlardır. Bu faaliyetler sonrasında STK'ların faaliyetleri tüm dünyaya yayılmıştır.

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2011 yılında başlayan Suriye iç savaşının en büyük yükünü neredeyse 4 milyon Suriyeliyi sınırlarına kabul eden Türkiye üstlenmiştir. Türkiye krizi tek başına ele almaya ve yönetmeye çalıştıysa da gerekli dış desteği alamamış ve tek başına kalmıştır. Alamadığı destek ve deneyim eksikliği, Türkiye'yi uluslararası STK'lara alan açmak zorunda bırakmış, bu alan ise Türkiye'nin hassasiyetleri nedeniyle sürekli bir kısıt içerisinde kalmıştır. Diğer bir ifadeyle Türk hükümeti bu sektörü hükümetin kanatları altına sokmak için bir sistem ya da bir merkez kuramamıştır. Türkiye'nin hassasiyetleri STK'lar ile Türk hükümeti arasındaki gerginliği artırmakla kalmamış ve Batı'daki bazı ülkeler Türkiye'yi demokratik imaja zarar vermekle suçlamışlardır.

Bu çalışma, her iki bakış açısını bir araya getirerek bu boşluğun köklerini incelemeye çalışmaktadır. Çalışma, Türk Hükümeti ile Suriye Krizi'nin başlamasından sonra Türkiye sınırları için faaliyet göstermeye başlayan uluslararası insani yardım kuruluşları arasındaki ilişki dinamiklerini anlamayı ve Türkiye'deki durumla tamamen farklı olan HINGOs (sivil uluslararası insani yardım kuruluşları) konseptine açıklık getirmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Bu araştırma yöntem olarak nitelik temelli olup, araştırma konusuyla direk ilişkili olan üst düzey hükümet yetkilileriyle ve Türk Hükümeti'nin farklı kurumları ile direk ilişkileri olan uluslararası yardım kuruluşlarının temsilcileriyle yapılan röportajlarla oluşturulmuştur. Bu röportajlar taraflar arasındaki yanlış anlaşılmaları, ilişki kopukluklarını ve özellikle 2016 yılında yaşanan darbe girişiminin ardından ortaya çıkan yasal belirsizliklerle beraber yaşanan zorlukları ve iş birliği fırsatlarını anlamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Ulaşılan sonuçlar şu şekilde özetlenebilir; Türk Hükümeti insani krizlerle baş etme hususunda tecrübe eksikliği yaşadığını ve hala yaşamakta olduğunu

kabul etmektedir. Dolayısıyla uluslararası insani yardım kuruluşları Türk Hükümeti ile iş birliği yapmanın zor olduğunu belirtmektedirler. Sistemsel yaklaşım eksiliği ve iki taraf arasındaki ilişkileri etkili bir şekilde organize edebilecek bir uzman birimin yokluğu, tarafların iş birliği içinde çalışamamasına neden olan ilişki kopukluklarının arkasındaki temel sebepleri oluşturmaktadır.

Bu çalışmayla ortaya konan öneriler, ilişki dinamiklerinin geliştirilmesine katkı sağlayacak bir iş birliği örneğiyle ilişki kopukluklarını gidermek ve insani çalışmalara daha fazla alan sağlamayı içermektedir. Böylelikle Türkiye'nin insani yardım faaliyetleri yürüten ülkeler arasındaki derecesi yükseltilebilir.

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